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Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and
Power Transition Theory
Abstract
Two of the biggest issues in international politics today are climate change and the ongoing
power transition between the United States and China. However, very few works examine
the way these issues interact with each other. This paper attempts to resolve this by
integrating climate change into power transition theory (PTT), which attempts to capture
the behavior of states in the midst of transition to or from global power. This paper first
analyzes the literatures on the (tenuous) links between environmental degradation and
interstate conflict as well as PTT. Opportunities for integration are then examined,
especially focusing on climate change's impact on the central variables of power and state
satisfaction. These theoretical links are then applied to the looming US-Sino transition and
highlight how climate change opens up new arenas of great power competition,
exacerbates tensions and impacts relative power in unpredictable ways.
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Introduction
One of the biggest issues in the contemporary global order is the
possible power transition between a declining American hegemon and
rising China. Power transitions are not unique in history and they have
the potential to unleash massive global conflict.1 What is unique about
a potential United States-Sino transition is that it will unfold
concurrently with increasing global shocks due to climate change.
Climate change poses many threats—ecological, economic,
sociological—including security. With the climate expected to warm
between one and two degrees by midcentury, the environment is going
to significantly shape how states relate to one another.2
The goal of this article is to make an initial foray into understanding
how climate change may impact power transitions, especially a possible
United States-Sino transition. This article focuses on building and
expanding theory, primarily power transition theory (PTT). Given the
uncertainties about climate change, it is difficult to make definitive
statements about what exactly will unfold. As a result, this article
cannot make concrete predictions at this point. Rather, this article aims
to identify and draw attention to the ways that climate change impacts
the central variables of PTT—power and state satisfaction—in the hopes
that as climate models improve with more data, theories that rely on
these variables are better able to anticipate and explain great power
transitions in an era defined by climate change.
By doing so, this article hopes to impact existing theory in three ways.
First, it is an initial foray in merging the growing body of
environmental security literature with existent theories of international
conflict, especially great power conflict. Second, it augments PTT’s
explanatory and predictive power about a coming transition between
China and the United States. No previous great power transition
occurred during such a prolonged period of significant environmental
change. By folding climate change into the calculus of transitions, PTT
becomes better able to explain contemporary events. Finally, this
article helps bridge a gap between earth science and political science.
There is a growing call from those in the hard climate sciences for
social science to study the political and social ramifications of climate
change and attempts to mitigate its effects.3
External and global forces are already having a profound impact on
state power and capabilities. For the last two years states have had to
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grapple with COVID-19 and its numerous consequences. The virus has
spawned economic crises due to global supply chains stretching to the
breaking point; countries are reeling to recoup losses from locked down
economies and significant increases in social spending and
international ties are straining due to vaccine nationalism. Should the
predictions about climate change come true, the crises of COVID-19
may be but a small harbinger of global shocks to come.4
Climate change will profoundly shape any transition between the
United States and China because it has the potential to significantly
influence the two variables central to PTT: power and state satisfaction.
Though power remains a difficult concept to operationalize,
contemporary measures utilize some amalgam of material military
capabilities, economic strength, and demographics.5 Climate change
will substantially impact these factors by stunting a state’s economic
growth, slowing its eventual rise to prominence, and by threatening
critical civilian, economic and/or military infrastructure and facilities.
Furthermore, states may attempt geoengineering projects to mitigate
the impacts of climate change in their region at the expense of possibly
deleterious effects in other states, making climate modification a new
arena of great power competition. Climate change may also alter a
state’s satisfaction with the status quo, primarily by opening new areas,
sea lanes and resource deposits, prompting new negotiations over their
exploitation.6 These new resources, coupled with the potential rising
costs of food, water and energy resources, may make it prohibitively
expensive for the exiting status quo power to continue to provide goods
to its allies, thus influencing their satisfaction.
This article begins by reviewing the literature on PTT, with a special
focus on its main variables of interest: power and satisfaction. The
literature on the relationship between climate change and conflict are
also briefly examined. The next section then outlines ways that climate
change may impact the central variables of PTT, with examples drawn
from contemporary China, United States, and other locales. A look at
possible avenues for future research and theory-building concludes.

Power Transition Theory and Environmental Security
First outlined by Organski, PTT shares many of the common
assumptions of neo-realism: the international system is anarchic, states
are the primary actors and power is the predominant force in
international relations. 7 At both the global and regional level, states are
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organized into numerous hierarchies based upon their material,
industrial, economic, and military capabilities as well as their
satisfaction, or level of contentment with the existing global system. At
the apex is the dominant status quo state, which creates a global system
in its own image, spreading values and institutions to maintain the
system. The next tier of major powers is mostly satisfied with this
system as well, either by virtue of being allies with the dominant power
or wooed by the goods provided by the dominant state—namely shared
defense, economic benefits through trade, and shared values and
diplomatic expectations.8 Over time, a rising challenger emerges which
may threaten the existing status quo. These challengers rise due to their
rapid economic, industrial and/or military development. They are
dissatisfied because they did not play a significant role in the crafting of
the existing order and now, with their newfound power, want to either
make changes to the system or create a new one in their own image.
Examples of such challengers include Wilhelmine Germany, post-Meiji
Japan and the Third Reich, and their attempts to alter the existing
structure resulted in two World Wars.
Conflicts between the rising challengers and the status quo bloc are
especially likely if the dominant status quo state believes (rightly or
wrongly) that its power is waning and that the revisionist bloc will soon
eclipse it. When this occurs, the status quo state has two options: either
find a way to incorporate the revisionist state into the existing system
(if possible) or fight a preventative war before the revisionist bloc
becomes too powerful. Revisionist states also feel pressure to engage in
conflict, either out of a fear that their own rise may soon peak or
concerns that the dominant state will pre-emptively attack.
In most PTT works, a state’s power is often operationalized as some
amalgam of its economic, military, demographic and/or resource
capabilities, with the National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset and
Gross Domestic Product being the most popular measures.9 For PTT
the relative power between the states in transition is essential.
Organski and Kugler argue power transitions begin when the
dissatisfied challenger is at 80 percent of the dominant state’s power,
and the transition is only over once the challenger’s power is 120
percent of the dominant status quo state.10
Power transition theory’s relevance today is seen most clearly in the
relationship between the United States and China. China’s meteoric
rise in economic, industrial and military power spawned a cottage
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industry of scholars attempting to discern if China is satisfied with the
status quo or not.11 Though these articles come to a wide range of
conclusions from China being satisfied to China seeking global
domination, the recent consensus in the literature views China as a
revisionist power seeking regional hegemony in East Asia.12 As a result,
China and the United States may not be locked in a struggle for global
supremacy but the odds of a more localized conflict in East Asia remain
high. The question about China’s satisfaction is more than mere
academic concern; it has real implications for U.S. foreign policy and
global stability. If China is a dissatisfied state, even on a regional level,
then it is a quintessential example of the rising challenger about which
PTT cautions. Rather, if it is a satisfied state, it could be a potential
stakeholder to help the United States maintain the global system.
Like other systemic realist theories, PTT treats the physical global
environment as static—a flat, unchanging billiard table on which the
balls of states careen into each other.13 What matters is the difference
in size of those billiard balls (their state power) and for PTT whether
they are striped or solid (revisionist or status quo). State power and
satisfaction fluctuates due to domestic capabilities and interactions
with other states. The theory ignores the table itself as it has no impact
on these characteristics. However, such assumptions create a blind spot
for PTT and other neorealist theories. The physical environment—the
table in this metaphor—will exert exogenous influence on both the
power and satisfaction of states, something the theory currently fails to
account for. It is therefore important to understand how climate
change might alter and inform the assumptions and core tenets of PTT
without overly burdening the theory. Doing so will also help another
area of research, the growing field of environmental security.
Building from the foundational work of Thomas Homer-Dixon, works
in environmental security examine the linkage between environmental
degradation and international conflict.14 Though most of these works
reside within comparative politics and examine domestic outbreaks of
violence and civil war, or look back at history to examine linkages,
other works attempt to identify prospective pathways between climate
change and international conflict.15 The findings are mixed. In general,
there is yet no direct, causal relationship between climate change and
international conflict.16 However, when environmental factors interact
with other variables, such as economic growth, regime type,
demographic changes or shared rivers, then international conflict may
emerge.17 Triggering events like famine, precipitation anomalies or
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extreme weather events may also increase the chances of international
conflict by imposing pressures on states.18 These pressures are more
acute when basic resources like water and food are in short supply.19 It
is worth stressing though that these linkages so far are speculative in
that no international conflict has yet emerged solely due to
environmental pressures. However, given the rising number of
environmental pressures and disasters and the already numerous civil
conflicts caused or exacerbated by climate issues, it is reasonable to
assume that such international conflicts are a matter of when, not if.20
Despite the earlier work of Homer-Dixon, contemporary work merging
the climate security literature with realist theory is sparse, leading to
some to call for a better incorporation of climate change into security
concerns.21 There are opportunities for the environmental security
literature to inform the assumptions and variables of PTT. Such an
exercise benefits both areas. It would increase PTT’s explanatory
potential for the contemporary world. Environmental security, on the
other hand, gains the ability to explain how environmental pressures
could lead to great power conflict, something which is currently
underdefined.

Climate Change and Power Transition Theory
Power transition theory rests upon the twin pillars of power and
satisfaction. Climate change will exogenously influence both variables
in important ways. Rising seas, changing crop patterns, natural
disasters and other environmental challenges put a significant strain on
a state’s economic, logistical, and military infrastructure, creating both
short-term and long-term relative power fluctuations. Furthermore,
technology is rapidly approaching the point where individual states can
engage in cheap, feasible forms of geoengineering. This is a new arena
of competition and power, where one state’s efforts to control the
climate or mitigate warming could cause deleterious effects in other
areas. Climate change holds the potential to also alter a state’s
satisfaction. States seemingly content with their allotment of goods,
such as territory and resources, may reconsider their support for the
status quo if climate change degrades these goods, or if the hegemon is
no longer able to maintain the integrity of these goods due to climactic
pressures, such as rising costs or disasters. The changing climate will
also require renegotiating existing institutions and treaties that
regulate common resource areas, a process that may get contentious.
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Climate Change and Power
Power transition theory operationalizes power by looking at the state’s
NMC score or GDP, though the efficacy of these measures is a continual
source of debate.22 A state’s NMC score is based upon its total
population, economy, military strength, and industrial capacity.
Climate change’s effects can quickly and adversely affect these
capacities and thus ability to utilize them to project power. Studies
show that higher temperatures detrimentally impact a state’s GDP
through many channels, such as decreased agricultural output, poorer
worker health and slower investment.23 Natural catastrophes or a series
of natural disasters could overleverage the insurance markets of states,
triggering a financial collapse similar to the 2008 global recession and
cripple a state’s economy.24 Climate change’s impacts are predicted to
lower global GDP by more than 7 percent by 2100, with the bulk of that
decline being felt in developing states, though even the United States
and Europe will experience detrimental effects.25
The costs of environmental damage and natural disasters are
increasing and billion-dollar disasters are becoming more common.26
Longer-term threats like sea-level rise, drought, famine, and crop loss
will put tremendous pressure on states, impacting economic
development. States facing immediate crises related to food, water,
shelter, and other basic needs will not have as much to spend on their
military, or their military will be too focused on internal recovery,
rescue, and resettlement programs to counter international threats. By
stifling economic growth, straining infrastructure, and diverting
resources away from the military, both short-term and long-term
climate change impacts can significantly affect a state’s power.
States are not equally vulnerable to climate change. States with more
economic resources, more responsive governments and better existing
infrastructure may adapt quicker to emerging climate threats. Those
with abundant land and resources, especially water and food, may
better weather climate change. For the United States, the main
challenges climate change poses are sea-level rise, eventual decrease in
crop production due to extreme temperatures and localized water
shortages.27 Economically, climate change projects to cause trillions of
dollars’ worth of damage to infrastructure and housing. For example,
sea level rise alone will cause anywhere between $1 trillion and $3.5
trillion in damages to coastal property by the end of the century.28 In
this new world, the United States must provide for its domestic base
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and respond to disasters in its heartland while also continuing to
maintain a global system of free trade and delivery of resources like
security guarantees, cheap goods, and international leadership. The
United States may have the resources to deal with the former, but
ignoring the latter means essentially ceding its role as a global leader.
China is already facing environmental challenges due to its crash
program of industrial development. Smog chokes numerous urban
centers on a consistent basis, resulting in shortened life spans and an
increase in asthma and other respiratory illnesses.29 Of larger concern
is the water supply of China. Due to pollution, irrigation,
industrialization and urbanization, China currently experiences water
stress as defined by the United Nations.30 What water there is heavily
polluted, with more than 140 million Chinese lacking access to
drinkable water and most China’s river basins containing water unfit
for human consumption.31 Due to rising populations and lower
availability of water, China’s water demand will exceed its supply by 25
percent by 2030.32
The water crisis manifests in different ways across China.33 In southern
China, floods and pollution run-off pose the biggest threats. In the
Pearl River region, home to Hong Kong, Shenzen, Macao and other
urban centers that account for roughly 10 percent of China’s GDP,
climate change is expected to significantly increase the occurrence of
major river flooding, tidal flooding and severe typhoons.34 Farms and
cities in northern China, which produces the vast majority of China’s
agriculture, suffer from droughts and water shortages, raising concerns
about the country’s food security.35 To address this spatial disparity,
China employed megaprojects like the Three Gorges Dam and the
South-North Water Transfer project, though even these massive
projects will not solve China’s water issues in the long-term.36 China
recently announced plans for a massive dam along the Brahmaputra
River which flows from Tibet into India.37 This raised tensions with
India, which fears decreased flows into their own country due to the
dam or possible future projects that transfer the water into northern
China.38 Furthermore, increasing temperatures will diminish rice
production, pushing more rural Chinese to the already overtaxed urban
centers in search of jobs and food.39 Coupled with demographic
challenges, increasing debt burden and the impact of the COVID-19
pandemic, these environmental pressures are a significant reason why
some believe China’s economic, industrial and military ascendency has
stalled.40
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Climate change does not just impose economic costs. It potentially
degrades and destroys a state’s military infrastructure, logistical
channels and exerts pressure on overseas commitments. This is
especially true of a state with global reach like the United States. In the
Eastern Pacific alone the U.S. Department of Defense has more than
40,000 buildings on more than 1,400 square miles, with an estimated
replacement cost of $180 billion.41 These sites are increasingly
vulnerable to sea level rise, storm surge, drought, wildfire and melting
permafrost. Among the vulnerable facilities include the essential
airbases and logistical hubs of Diego Garcia and Guam, as well as the
missile defense base on Kwajalein Atoll.42 However, the Department of
Defense is not budgeting for these impacts in their base planning, even
though these threats are already presenting. This significantly raises
costs for base repair and replacement and could lead to the loss of some
bases completely.43
Climate change challenges not just overseas U.S. bases and
infrastructure. Domestic bases face similar threats. A recent
Department of Defense report found that that half of America’s
domestic bases are vulnerable to climate change, primarily in the form
of drought, flooding, severe storms, wildfires, melting permafrost and
other effects.44 These events will cause loss of buildings, limited
training days, recurrent flooding and destroyed base infrastructure. For
example, in October 2018 Hurricane Michael hit Tyndall Air Force Base
with Category 4 winds. The base is home to one of the U.S. Air Force’s
(USAF) precious few F-22 squadrons. Seventeen of the state-of-the-art
aircraft, almost ten percent of the entire F-22 fleet, was undergoing
maintenance on the base and could not fly out before the storm hit. The
storm significantly damaged the hangars holding the aircraft, causing
roofs to collapse and dropping debris onto them. Fortunately for the
USAF, they repaired all seventeen aircraft and brought them back into
service. If the storm destroyed all the jets, it would be the single largest
loss of American aircraft since the Vietnam War and would decimate
America’s stealth fighter fleet. As of 2021, Tyndall Air Force Base is still
undergoing costly repairs and may not be fully mission ready until the
mid-2020s.45
Great powers like the United States or China may try to mitigate these
threats to their power by engaging in geoengineering projects. Dozens
of proposals exist for different types of geoengineering strategies, from
mirrors in space to cloud seeding.46 The most feasible and off-the-shelf
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ready strategy is solar radiation management (SRM) which involves
dispersing significant amounts of cooling or reflective agents into the
stratosphere, usually from aircraft, with the goal of radiating heat back
out into space, cooling the region it covers.47 This may help a state keep
a region or even its whole territory somewhat cooler, but it is unknown
if such an action would then cause more rain or hotter weather or
extreme events in neighboring countries or even halfway around the
world.48
Solar radiation management requires only a simple modification to
military or civilian aircraft and is within the realm of capabilities of
most states as well as wealthy and technically proficient nonstate actors
or even individuals.49 As a result, a lone actor can unilaterally embark
on these projects with little or no cooperation with other states. None
of these proposals have yet to move off the drawing board at a large
scale, but as the climate changes and states try to address the
consequences, geoengineering may quickly become a booming
industry. This is especially problematic because most geoengineering
strategies are thus far merely theoretical, and the larger, global
ramifications of these practices are little understood.
If SRM or other geoengineering strategies prove to be cheap,
technologically feasible and effective in locally mitigating the worst
effects of climate change, it is not too much of a leap to assume states
will employ these tools offensively. Or, alternatively, if one state sets a
cooling goal at a certain temperature but another state wants to nullify
those efforts or has a different temperature goal in mind, they can
engage in counter geoengineering. For example, if a state uses SRM to
cool the world or region to a certain degree, another state could launch
their own fleet of aircraft to flood the air with chemicals or other
particles that offset the actions of the original state.50 This could create
a tug of war between states over what the proper degree of warming
should be.51 New realms of power competition can profoundly change
the nature of state relationships and offer another avenue for rising
challengers to seek supremacy. One need only to look at Russia, China,
Iran, or North Korea’s development of offensive weapons in the realm
of cyberwarfare to see these forces at work. Geoengineering could
quickly become another such arena, triggering another arms race, and
creating another realm for conflict and escalation.
China is already embarking on smaller-scale geoengineering projects,
including efforts on the Tibetan plateau in to increase rainfall in the
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region and testing artificial upwelling of deep ocean water to increase
the ocean’s CO2 absorption.52 Given China’s history of massive
infrastructure projects, from the Three Gorges Dam to the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI), geoengineering is a logical extension of current
patterns.53 However, going this route would be hugely disruptive and
problematic for China or any state. First, no state has ever attempted
geoengineering on such a scale, and its impacts on both the immediate
surrounding area and broader global climate are unknown. Second, if a
state goes down this path it may spark a global arms race in
geoengineering techniques and expertise in which the powerful states
protect their own citizens and may even seek to engage in offensive
geoengineering. Or, if another state believes that its relative power
would benefit from a warmer world, it may engage in countergeoengineering, turning the stratosphere into a battleground of
aerosols and chemicals. Thus, while the temptation may be especially
acute for states most at risk of food insecurity, water stress or sea level
rise to engage in these kinds of projects, committing to them opens a
whole new, unexplored arena of great power conflict.
Climate change threatens the economic and military aspects of state
power, even among the great powers. While the impacts so far are
relatively localized and small, costs will increase in the future.54 What
remains unknown is the level of relative impacts across states. In PTT,
state power fluctuates due to domestic capabilities of generating wealth
and power or success or defeat on the battlefield. Power transition
theory needs to expand and adapt to better incorporate exogenous
forces’ ability to profoundly alter relative power dynamics in the global
system.
Climate Change and State Satisfaction
While climate change will alter state power, its effects will spur states to
reconsider their stance vis a vis the status quo. States that once
supported the status quo division of territories, resources and other
goods may reconsider their position if those goods become scarcer or
new partitions are necessary. Competition over common resource areas
like watersheds, rivers, fishing grounds and forests may increase,
upending existing agreements and causing states to re-examine their
contentment with the status quo.55 Climate change is also making areas
that were once geopolitically or economically worthless, such as the
Arctic, into desirable and contested regions.
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Increasing warmth has dramatically limited the extent and presence of
sea ice in the Arctic, opening new sea-lanes and making hithertounreachable mineral and oil deposits accessible.56 As a result, the area
is a hotbed of activity, as Norway, Canada, Russia, and other countries
all vie for control.57 The changes to the Arctic are already causing both
China and the United States to re-evaluate their position in the region.
The economic and resource potential of the region has risen
significantly in recent years. A northern sea lane will decrease the travel
time for ships from the east coast of China to the United States and
Europe and put less reliance on the chokepoint in the Strait of
Malacca.58 China lacks a direct coastline with the Arctic Ocean and as a
result has only an observer status in the existing treaty regime. In 2018
China released its Arctic Policy in which it proclaimed itself a near
Arctic state, a term that has no legal meaning but hints at China’s
desire to have more of a say. The Arctic Policy continues by calling for
equal access for research, collaboration by “all stakeholders—including
states from both inside and outside the Arctic” and the possibility of a
multinationally-backed “Polar Silk Road.”59 To pursue these aims,
China is expanding its icebreaking fleet, deploying numerous research
teams to the region and investing heavily in international
infrastructure projects.60 These moves and others signal that China is
clearly not satisfied with its current place in Arctic relations and wants
to exert more influence in an increasingly valuable region.
Given these realities, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Arctic Policy in
2019 clearly outlines the risks in the region and the need for more
money and resources to deal with infrastructure loss as well as counter
growing Chinese and Russian forces. The Arctic Policy states the
United States “does not recognize any other claims to Arctic status by
any state” other than the eight states with immediate coastlines on the
Arctic Ocean.61 It further clarifies that “despite China’s claim of being a
‘Near Arctic State,’ the United States does not recognize any such
status.”62 The report outlines that one of the main goals of the United
States should be to counter Chinese influence, not let them get a
foothold or expand its pattern of global “predatory economic
behavior.”63 The Arctic is therefore “vulnerable to ‘strategic spillover’
from tensions competition or conflict” between rivals.64
The Arctic example highlights how climate change is altering the
priorities and satisfaction of a state. Now that the world is warming and
sea ice is retreating, the region has tremendous economic and resource
potential, especially for states that rely on overseas exports and
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shipping. Given this rise in the value of the Arctic, China is no longer
content to be a mere bystander in the governance and access to the area
and wants to have more influence. This raises suspicions and concerns
from the stakeholders of the existing status quo. With the United States
refusing to recognize Chinese attempts at expansion in the Arctic,
tensions between the states will continue for the near future. Should
other areas become more valuable because of a changing climate—such
as more fertile farmland, new waterways and coastlines, a decline in
impenetrable foliage—then these forces will likely play out again,
further ratcheting up United States-Sino tensions.
Geoengineering could also play a role in changing (or responding to)
state satisfaction. If a state or group of states engages in geoengineering
to keep the globe at a certain temperature, it will trigger a global debate
over what temperature to set the thermostat. Furthermore, since
geoengineering’s effects are so little understood, it is not hard to
imagine blame falling on the geoengineering state for every
meteorological disaster or negative effect of climate change. For
example, any disruption to the monsoon that India and Pakistan rely
upon will trigger significant anger from those states, and another
state’s geoengineering project could be the culprit.65 The state or group
of states engaging in geoengineering thus risks becoming a scapegoat
for every hurricane, drought, famine, shift in rainfall and other
disaster. If these outcomes are severe enough, it may result in a
suffering state significantly reconsidering its priorities and satisfaction
with the status quo.
States may also face immediate or long-term existential threats that
profoundly alter their outlook on the world. A status quo state may find
itself dissatisfied due to barren lands, inundated coastlines, or starving
people. China’s water crisis is especially salient here. An increasingly
thirsty China may embark on risky and provocative measures to
quench its people, possibly resulting in further tensions with India or
seeking claims on the abundant water resources of eastern Siberia. As
more states begin to grapple with the deleterious impacts of climate
change, the dominant status quo state and its fellow maintainers will
need to keep its partners content by helping shoulder the burden of
recovery. This may prove prohibitively expensive, as the dominant state
itself deals with its own issues or the sheer quantity of impacts makes it
impossible to adequately respond to all of them.
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For the dominant status quo state, climate change raises the costs of
maintaining the system. This dominant state creates and defends the
international system, but PTT assumes this system rooted in
unchanging geophysical foundation. As the climate changes the face of
the Earth, that foundation begins to crack, putting tremendous
pressure on the system overall and the states in charge of maintaining
it. The global military commitments necessary to project power
increase the hegemon’s vulnerability to climactic shocks. The existing
distribution of goods may need a complete overhaul. The relative power
of allies may fluctuate or degrade significantly in the face of climatedriven disasters. Economic, military and/or humanitarian aid may
require massive outlays. In short, rising sea levels, melting polar caps,
refugee movements, increasing tempo of natural disasters and debates
over GHG emission levels all make it more difficult for the dominant
status quo state to hold the system together.

Conclusion
Climate change is already exerting pressure on the economic and
military power of states and changing the calculus of state satisfaction,
even for great powers. This article seeks to expand theory by
highlighting PTT’s need to recognize these developments and
incorporate climate change as a critical exogenous force to better
explain the contemporary world, especially a possible United StatesSino transition. Continual improvement of models and projections for
climate change should spur a re-examination and assessment of the
arguments made in this article, as well as neo-realist theories of great
power politics in general.
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